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I.

INTRODUCTION

On August 28, 2007 Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich signed Senate

Bill 1434 into law,' thereby creating the Illinois Citizen Participation Act.2
With enactment of the Citizen Participation Act (CPA), Illinois joined more

1. B. Status for S. B. 1434, 95th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2007), 14 LEGIS. SYNOPSIS &
DIGEST, at 876-77, availableat http://www.ilga.gov (follow "Bills and Resolutions" hyper-

link; then under the "Senate-Bills" heading follow "1401 - 1500" hyperlink; then follow
"SB 1434 Citizen Participation" hyperlink).
2.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, 2007 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 5223-24
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/1-99).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITYLA WREVEW

[Vol. 28

than twenty other states3 in passing legislation that attempts to eliminate or
diminish what have come to be termed "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation," or "SLAPPs. ' 4 While the problem of SLAPP litigation is
one deserving of legislative attention, this comment will argue that the Citizen Participation Act could apply to situations well outside those it was
meant to address, and in doing so, fails to achieve its stated goal of balancing the constitutional rights of civil plaintiffs and defendants.
Part I of this comment will provide an overview of the SLAPP phenomenon, including a discussion of the hallmark attributes of a SLAPP, the
reasons why SLAPPs have been deemed contrary to public policy, and
other solutions proposed to combat and eliminate SLAPPs. Part II will
discuss the legislative history of the Illinois Citizen Participation Act, outline its stated goals, and discuss the substantive and procedural mechanisms
employed to achieve those goals. Part III will compare the CPA to similar
legislation enacted by other states to analyze the potential for the CPA to
overstep its boundaries, chill potential plaintiffs from bringing meritorious
claims, and thereby fail to achieve the goals it sets out to accomplish. Part
III will then suggest and explain two relatively simple measures that, if
taken, could counteract the potential for such chilling effects and better
effectuate the balance Illinois is attempting to achieve.
II.
A.

THE SLAPP PHENOMENON

STRATEGIC LAWSUITS AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

The term "Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation," or
"SLAPP," was developed by University of Denver professors George W.
Pring and Penelope Canan 6 to help describe what they saw as the increasing
use of civil litigation to quash citizen participation in government. 7 Gener3.
See infra note 149 for a listing of statutes from other jurisdictions. A comprehensive directory of states that have passed or considered legislation directed at the SLAPP
issue is also available on the California Anti-SLAPP Project's website at
http'//www.casp.net.
4.
See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
5.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act No. 95-506, § 5, 2007 I1.Legis. Serv. 5223
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/5).
6.
GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPs: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING
OUT 3 (1996) [hereinafter PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs]. See also Penelope Canan & George
W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation:Mixing Quantitative
and Qualitative Approaches, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 385, 386 (1988) (demonstrating early
use of the term "SLAPP").

7.
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 2. Pring and Canan consider
SLAPPs a "new breed" of litigation, but they claim to have found SLAPP suits in American
courts that date back as far as 1802. PRrNG & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 1, 3, 17.
However, Pring stated that "virtually all of the cases we have found have been filed after
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ally, SLAPPs are "legally meritless suits designed, from their inception, to
intimidate and harass political critics into silence.",8 The SLAPP suit does
not seek victory on the merits, but rather victory by attrition. 9 According to
Jerome Braun, the "object is to quell opposition by fear of large recoveries
and legal costs, by diverting energy and resources from opposing the project into defending the lawsuit, and by transforming the debate from a political one to a judicial one, with a corresponding shift of issues from the
targets' grievances to the filers' grievances."' 0 More bluntly, "[t]he apparent goal of SLAPPs is to stop citizens from exercising their political rights
or to punish them for having done so. ' 1
As one would expect, SLAPPs do not announce themselves as such;
instead they "masquerade" as any number of seemingly "ordinary" tort
suits, including libel, slander, tortious interference with a contract or a business interest, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and, less often,
causes of action based on alleged violations of the prospective plaintiff's
constitutional rights, such as due process or equal protection. '2 Ultimately,
the SLAPP plaintiff is not limited to any one category of tort action because
the goal is political, not legal, success, and proving the precise elements of
any particular cause of action is of secondary concern-if of any concern at
all.' The idea is that the SLAPP plaintiffs goals are achieved through the
ancillary effects of the lawsuit itself on the defendant, not through an adjudication on the merits. 14 Therefore, the plaintiffs choice of what cause of
action to plead matters little. 5

1970." George W. Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,7 PACE
L. REv. 3, 5 (1989) [hereinafter Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation].
8.
Edmond Costantini & Mary Paul Nash, SLAPP/SLAPPback: The Misuse of
Libel Lawfor PoliticalPurposes and a Countersuit Response, 7 J.L. & POL 417, 423 (1991)
(defining SLAPPs in the context of libel suits).
9.
See U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963,
970-71 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The hallmark of a SLAPP suit is that it lacks merit, and is brought
with the goals of obtaining an economic advantage over a citizen party by increasing the cost
of litigation to the point that the citizen party's case will be weakened or abandoned, and of
deterring future litigation.").
10.
Jerome .Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection:Unburdening the Right of Petition in California,32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 965, 969-70 (1999) [hereinafter Braun, Increasing
SLAPP Protection].
11.
Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,supra note 7,
at 5-6.
12.
Pring, SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,supra note 7,
at 8-9 & n.11-15.
13.
See Braun,Increasing SLAPP Protection,supranote 10, at 970.
14.
Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supranote 10, at 970.
15.
See Braun,IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supranote 10, at 970.
ENVTL.
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Because SLAPPs come disguised in various forms of tort suits, and
because a successful SLAPP will, almost by definition, preclude appellate
review and reporting, a primary difficulty with SLAPPs is properly identifying them as such.16 Pring and Canan, regarded as the seminal experts on
the subject, have therefore developed a working definition: a SLAPP is a
lawsuit involving "communications made to influence a governmental action or outcome," that, "secondarily, result[s] in ... a civil complaint or
counterclaim... filed against nongovernment[al] individuals or organizations ... on... a substantive issue of some public interest or social significance." 17 For Pring and Canan, the hallmark of any SLAPP lawsuit is the
18
involvement of activity that implicates the defendant's First Amendment
right to petition the government for redress of grievances.' 9 Their definition explicitly eschews reliance on the underlying subjective motivation
behind the plaintiff's suit as a tool for identifying a SLAPP, instead relying
on the nature of the conduct giving rise to the litigation in the first place.20
Accordingly, it is the implication of a citizen's right to petition that distinguishes a SLAPP from the "everyday retaliatory lawsuits seen in the business, labor, contract and other arenas., 21 Such petitioning activity may
include testifying at a local school board or zoning commission meeting;
writing letters to public officials; filing a consumer complaint; circulating a
petition; lobbying for reform legislation; or participating in a political demonstration.2 2
The status of the parties to SLAPP litigation can vary widely and there
are no set categories for who initiates and who is targeted by a SLAPP.23
However, SLAPPs typically occur in a local setting and relate to a matter of
local concern. 24 The targets 25 of SLAPPs are, more often than not, con16.
See Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supra note 10, at 973.
17.
PIlNG & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 8-9. Pring and Canan developed
their criteria as a means of objectively and efficiently identifying SLAPP litigation for inclusion in their extensive research studies on the alleged phenomenon. See PRING & CANAN,
SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 8.
18.
U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
19.
See PRrNG & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 8. But cf. Joseph W. Beatty,
Note, The Legal Literature on SLAPPs: A Look Behind the Smoke Nine Years After Pring
and Canan First Yelled "Fire!',9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 85, 96 (1997) (criticizing Pring
and Canan for artificially elevating the right to petition above other First Amendment rights
for the purposes of constitutional analysis).
20.
PRiNG & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 8.
21.
PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supranote 6, at 8.
George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, "StrategicLawsuits Against Public Par22.
ticipation" ("SLAPPs '): An Introductionfor Bench, Bar, and Bystanders, 12 BRIDGEPORT
L. REv. 937, 938 (1992).
23.
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 214-17.
24.
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 215. The implication is that
larger, nationally-oriented entities have less need to rely on SLAPPs to further their interests
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cerned citizens acting primarily on a matter relating to the public interest.26
In contrast, the parties who initiate SLAPPs, whether an individual or some
manner of business organization, are overwhelmingly focused solely on
their own economic benefit.27 The classic SLAPP thus pits the concerned
citizen, or group of citizens, against some business interest, such as a land
developer or industrial polluter, who would face the prospect of economic
loss from the citizens' petitioning activity.28 The archetypal SLAPP plays
out something like this: 29 a group of homeowners, concerned with a land
developer's plan to utilize their street as a means of access to a proposed
residential subdivision, successfully petitions their local government to
have the street de-classified as a public roadway, thereby placing the developer's plan for the new subdivision into jeopardy. 30 The developer's economic interests now at risk, he or she files a lawsuit against the homeowners for slander, conspiring with town officials, and intentionally interfering
with the developer's prospective economic advantage. 31 The suit seeks
compensatory damages in the millions.32 The action is eventually dismissed as meritless, 33 but the harm has already been done; having to endure
the emotional and financial strain of years of litigation, the defendants,
though victorious, have learned all too well the potential consequences of
deterred from ever again interspeaking their mind, and they are possibly
34
jecting themselves into local politics.

because their status and economic resources grant them access to more effective means by
which to influence political debate. See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supranote 6, at 216.
25.
To avoid confusion when discussing SLAPPs that emerge via counterclaims to
already existing lawsuits, Pring and Canan prefer to use the terms "filer" and "target" in lieu
of "plaintiff' and "defendant." PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 9-10. For purposes of this article, the terms plaintiff and defendant are sufficient so long as it is recognized that in certain situations, such as countersuits, the roles can be reversed.
26.
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 215. Pring and Canan's empirical conclusions regarding the motives of parties involved in SLAPPs are based on data collected in a national survey conducted in connection with the research study that forms the
basis for their book; the findings of the study are appended to the treatise. See PRING &
CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 211.
27.
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 216.
28.
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 213-15, 220.
29.
The following hypothetical is based on Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740
F. Supp. 523 (N.D. 111.1990). Westfield is an oft-cited example of a SLAPP suit. See, e.g.,
Mamie Stetson, Reforming SLAPP Reform: New York's Anti-SLAPP Statute, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REV.1324,1324 (1995).
30.
Westfield, 740 F. Supp. at 524.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.at 527.
34.
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 5, 8, 29.
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THE CHILLING EFFECTS OF SLAPPS

It is this alleged chilling effect on citizen involvement with government that is the great evil of the SLAPP.35 The First Amendment right to
petition is "among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill
of Rights. 3 6 The First Amendment "embodies our Nation's commitment to
popular self-determination and our abiding faith that the surest course for
developing sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views on public
issues. 3 7 Furthermore, no aspect of the First Amendment "is more rightly
treasured than its protection of the ability of our people through free and
open debate to consider and resolve their own destiny., 38 SLAPPs chill
these important rights in a number of ways.
First, defending a SLAPP can impose significant temporal 39 and financial burdens on the defendant, sapping his or her resolve to move forward
with the underlying petitioning activity that gave rise to the SLAPP in the
first place. 40 Financial costs to a SLAPP defendant can include legal fees,
opportunities lost as a result of time spent defending the suit, and, in cases
where the defendants are fortunate enough to have coverage to pay for their
defense, increased insurance premiums.4 Typically, though not always, the
plaintiffs in SLAPPs have more substantial financial resources at their disposal with which to prosecute their claims than the defendants have available to counter them.42 Economically strong plaintiffs are thus in a position
to absorb the costs associated with protracted litigation in a manner not
usually available to the prospective defendants. 43 This effect is only exacerbated by the often exorbitant damages sought in SLAPP suits. 44 Defendants are thus forced to weigh the importance of exercising their right to be
35.
See, e.g., Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supra note 10, at 971 ("SLAPP
suits chill the right of free expression and free access to government, a double-barreled assault on the core values of our society.").
36.
United Mine Workers, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State B. Assn, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
37.
Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
38.
Id.
39.
Pring and Canan found that the average lifespan for a SLAPP lawsuit in the
judicial system was 40 months. PrING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supranote 6, at 218.
40.
See Frederick M. Rowe & Leo M. Romero, Resolving Land-Use Disputes by
Intimidation:SLAPP Suits in New Mexico, 32 N.M. L. REv. 217, 219 (2002).
41.
See Costantini & Nash, supra note 8, at 420-21 n.9. Costantini and Nash provide a sobering estimate of how high the price can be, estimating that the average cost of
defending a libel suit at the time of their article was $150,000. Costantini & Nash, supra
note 8, at 420-21 n.9.
42.
Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supra note 10, at 970.
43.
Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supra note 10, at 970.
44.
At the time of their national survey, Pring and Canan estimated that the average
damages sought by plaintiffs in SLAPP suits was $9.1 million. PRNG & CANAN, SLAPPs,
supra note 6, at 217.
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heard against what can appear to be a potentially crippling risk to their personal financial security. 45 The result is that instead of maintaining focus on
the political issue that brought about the SLAPP, defendants will almost
inevitably attempt to shift their efforts to expeditiously resolving their now
preeminent legal troubles. 46 Furthermore, even if a SLAPP defendant is
victorious on the merits, he or she will certainly think twice before ever
again participating in civic affairs.47 Such results are exactly what the
SLAPP plaintiff desires. 8
Second, and perhaps more troubling than the direct chilling effect on a
particular named defendant, is the ripple effect a SLAPP produces in a
given community. 49 Even the hardiest of community activists can be deterred from voicing their opinions when they witness their neighbors face
lawsuits for similar actions. ° The irony is that the more important the issue,
the greater likelihood the chilling effect will spread through the community.5 1 As media coverage would presumably be the greatest for issues of
wide appeal or importance, it follows that more of the citizenry will be
aware of the potential consequences of voicing their opinion. 52
The combined result of both the direct and indirect chilling effects
brought about by SLAPPs is no less than a distortion of the American process of open government. 53 Simply put, "[i]nstitutions such as a free press
neutral government do not work if people are afraid to use
and a reasonably
,54
them.
C.

COMBATING SLAPPS

Once the chilling effects of SLAPPs were recognized as a threat to the
constitutional rights of citizens, the obvious question was what should (and
could) be done to reduce or stop them. However, solutions to the SLAPP
45.
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 138-39.
46.
See PRNG & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 138-39.
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 5.
47.
48.
Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supra note 10, at 969-70.
49. See Rowe & Romero, supra note 40, at 219; see also PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs,
supra note 6, at 11 ("[T]he lives of most SLAPP targets are dramatically altered and the
political lives and futures of untold others in the community influenced by the 'ripple effects'-predominantly the recommendation of those affected that others not speak out or
participate in government decision-making.").
50.
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 219.
51.
See Rowe & Romero, supra note 40, at 219.
See Rowe & Romero, supra note 40, at 219; see also PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs,
52.
supra note 6, at 219 (explaining the connection between awareness of SLAPPs and the likelihood of future political participation).
53.
Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supranote 10, at 972.
54.
Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supranote 10, at 971-72.
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phenomenon are not easy.55 In addition to the inherent difficulty in identifying SLAPPs,5 6 solutions to SLAPP litigation are complicated by the competing interests of prospective plaintiffs to seek redress from the courts and
recover damages for injuries sustained and the interests of potential defendants to exercise their rights of speech and petition.5 7 Thus, any solution to
the problem of SLAPPs must pay careful attention to avoid infringing on
one right in favor of another. 58 Different approaches have emerged to combat the SLAPP problem, including countersuits by SLAPP defendants
against the plaintiffs, 59 reliance on constitutional legal doctrines, 60 and, perhaps the most prevalent, statutory responses.6 '
Suits by SLAPP defendants against plaintiffs, or "SLAPPbacks" as
they are typically known, 62 attempt to turn the tables on the SLAPP plaintiff
by filing a countersuit grounded in claims of abuse of judicial process, malicious prosecution, and interference with the defendant's constitutional
rights. 63 The idea is that such countersuits will deter potential SLAPP plaintiffs through large damage awards and negative publicity. 64 While Pring and
Canan have called the SLAPP-back the "most promising prevention and
cure for the SLAPP phenomenon," the tactic is not without its flaws.65
First, because SLAPP plaintiffs are not concerned with conventional legal
victory, traditional remedies to meritless litigation, such as sanctions
against the plaintiff attorney or suits for abuse of process or malicious
prosecution, are ill-suited to the SLAPP paradigm. 66 Abuse of process or
malicious prosecution claims typically cannot arise unless the litigant filing
the action has lost the underlying case.67 This both prolongs litigation, with
its attendant costs, and keeps the focus of the dispute in the courts as opposed to the political arena-the exact results the SLAPP plaintiff hopes to
55.
Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supranote 10, at 972-73.
56.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
57.
John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of
SLAPPs, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 395, 397-98 (1993) [hereinafter Barker, Common-Law]; see
also Barbara Arco, Comment, When Rights Collide: Reconciling the First Amendment
Rights of Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587 (examining the
conflicting rights debate in greater detail).
58.
See, e.g., Barker, Common-Law, supra note 57, at 397-98; Braun, Increasing
SLAPP Protection,supra note 10, at 972-73.
59.
See, e.g., Costantini & Nash, supranote 8, at 425.
60.
See Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supra note 10, at 984-89.
61.
See statutes cited infra note 149.
62.
See, e.g., PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 168; Costantini & Nash,
supra note 8, at 425.
63.
See Costantini & Nash, supranote 8, at 425.
64.
See Costantini & Nash, supranote 8, at 425.
65.
See PRwiG & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 168.
66.
Dixon v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687, 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
67.
Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supranote 10, at 990-91.
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achieve. 68 Furthermore, malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims
69
are generally disfavored by courts and success on the merits is difficult.
Second, as Pring and Canan themselves point out, the SLAPP-back is only
practically feasible if there is a solid chance of success, as attorneys working on a contingency fee basis will only take the case if they see a likelihood of recouping the expenses incurred in developing the action. 70 This
prevents the SLAPP-back from being a viable model in all circumstances. 7'
Constitutional remedies to SLAPP suits have also received much attention, particularly the United States Supreme Court's Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. 2 Noerr-Pennington stems from a series of Supreme Court cases
in the antitrust arena.73 The doctrine has its origins in Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., where the Court reviewed a trucking association's allegations that a publicity and lobbying
campaign directed by competitor railroads violated federal antitrust statutes. 74 The Court held that the Petition Clause 75 exempted the railroads'
conduct from application of the statute, regardless of whether it was anticompetitive in nature, because their conduct was directed at influencing
government decisions. 76 However, the Court also stated in dicta that situations might arise where a "publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be
justified., 77 The Court later seized upon Noerr's so-called "sham exception" 78 and held that a trucking conglomerate was not immune from anti68.
Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supranote 10, at 991.
69.
See Levin v. King, 648 N.E.2d 1108, 1110(111. App. Ct. 1995). King is a prototypical SLAPP-back and exemplifies the inherent difficulties in the SLAPP-back model.
70.
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supranote 6, at 185-86.
71.
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supranote 6, at 185-86.
72.
See, e.g., PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 15-29; Braun, Increasing
SLAPP Protection,supra note 10, at 980-83; Erin Malia Lum, Note, Hawai'i's Response to
Strategic Litigation Against Public Participationand the Protection of Citizens' Right to
Petitionthe Government, 24 U. HAW. L. REv. 411, 417-22 (2007).
73.
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. RR. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
74. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 129. In particular, the truckers alleged violations of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000). Id.
75.
U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging... the right
of the people... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
76. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138, 145. The Court affirmed Noerr in the subsequent case
of United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965), where it reversed an
award of damages against a coal miner's union because the damages were based in large part
on the union's attempts to influence government decision making relating to miners' wages.
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670-72.
77.
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
78.
See, e.g., Braun, IncreasingSLAPP Protection,supranote 10, at 982.
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trust liability when their petitioning activity was aimed at denying their
competition "meaningful access" to the courts.79
In City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., the Court
clarified when a defendant's conduct constituted such a "sham., 80 Omni
Outdoor Advertising filed an antitrust suit against a competitor, alleging
that the competitor was conspiring with Columbia, South Carolina city officials to prevent Omni from entering the local billboard market. 81 The lower
court found for Omni and awarded damages.82 In reversing the decision,
the Supreme Court found the competitor's actions were immune from antitrust liability because they were a "genuine attempt to influence governmental action., 83 The Court stated that "[t]he 'sham' exception to Noerr
encompasses situations in which persons use the governmental process - as
opposed to the outcome of that process - as an anticompetitive weapon.'84
The Court later adopted a two-part test to determine when ostensible
petitioning activity was a "sham" not genuinely aimed at influencing government action and therefore not protected by the general Noerr immunity. 85 To constitute a "sham," petitioning activity must first be "objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically
expect success on the merits. '' 86 Second, and only if the court finds that the
petitioner's activity was objectively baseless, the subjective intent of the
petitioner must be examined to determine "whether the baseless lawsuit
conceals 'an attempt
to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
87
competitor."'

79.
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512, 516 (1972).
80.
See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991).
81.
Id. at 368-69.
82.
Id. at 369.
83.
Id. at 382.
84.
Id. at 380.
85.
Prof I Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
60 (1993). ProfessionalReal EstateInvestors involved an antitrust action by a group of hotel
operators against a number of major motion picture studios. Id. at 52. The dispute originated
when the studios filed a copyright suit against the hotel operators for improperly renting and
distributing copies of recorded movies to which the studios held the rights. Id. The hotels
counterclaimed and sought damages for restraint of trade and conspiracy. Id. They alleged
that the Noerr immunity should not apply because the studios' copyright suit was really just
a sham designed to cover up their monopolistic and anti-competitive motives. Id. at 54. The
Court was tasked with deciding whether subjective or objective criteria govern the determination of whether a petitioner's actions were "genuinely" aimed at procuring favorable government action. Id. at 57.
86.
Id. at 60.
87.
Id. at 60-61 (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight,

Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961)).
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Although the Omni decision was lauded for articulating a clear, simple
test that would allow for early and efficient dismissal of SLAPPs, 88 the efficacy of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine to deal with SLAPPs expeditiously
enough to avoid their chilling effects is still somewhat uncertain. 9 Furthermore, while various federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have
used the logic of Noerr-Pennington beyond its antitrust origins, 9° the propriety of doing so has been vigorously criticized. 91 However, NoerrPennington has been influential in the development of what appears to have
method employed to combat SLAPPs-the state
now become the primary
"anti-SLAPP" statute.92
III.
A.

THE ILLINOIS CITIZEN PARTICIPATION ACT

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS CITIZEN PARTICIPATION ACT

The CPA was not the first attempt by Illinois legislators to enact some
form of anti-SLAPP remedy: several bills had been introduced in previous93
General Assemblies, but all withered and eventually died in committee.
PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supranote 6, at 26.
88.
See Stetson, supra note 29, at 1340 (arguing that because the current incarnation
89.
of Noerr-Pennington requires at least some inquiry into the intent of the litigants, a jury trial
could be in order and preclude an early resolution of the SLAPP); see also Lum, supra note
72, at 420 (arguing that Noerr-Pennington,while "providing guidelines for protection of
First Amendment petitioning rights [does] not constitute a formal 'test' for determining the
scope of protection to be afforded").
90.
See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (applying the logic of Noerr-Penningtonto the civil rights action); Manistee Town Center v. City
of Glendale, 227 F.3d 1090, 1091-93 (9th Cir. 2000) (utilizing Noerr-Penningtonin context
of § 1983 action).
91.
See Christopher L. Sagers, The Legal Structure ofAmerican Freedom and the
Provenance of the Antitrust Immunities, 2002 UTAH L. REv. 927, 932 (2002) (arguing that
Noerr-Pennington has been improperly applied outside the antitrust arena); Beatty, supra
note 19, at 102 (arguing that interpreting Claiborneto extend Noerr-Penningtonbeyond the
antitrust context is to misread the case).
See PRING & CANAN, SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 199-201 (discussing how Min92.
nesota and Rhode Island have incorporated language from the Noerr-Pennington line of
cases into their anti-SLAPP laws).
These include Senate Bill 1633 and House Bill 4315 introduced in 2002 and
93.
Senate Bill 168 and House Bill 2649 introduced in 2003. While not identical to the CPA, the
bills were all similarly aimed at immunizing Illinois citizens from SLAPP-style lawsuits. To
find the status and history of any of the above bills, see the Illinois General Assembly's
website at http://www.ilga.gov (follow "Previous General Assemblies" hyperlink; select the
appropriate legislative session from the drop-down menu, "92nd (2002-2003)" for Senate
Bill 1633 and House Bill 4315, "93rd 2003-2004" for Senate Bill 168 and House Bill 2649;
then select the "Search" option next to the topic "Legislation & Laws"; then enter the appropriate bill number into the search field, for example "HB4135" for House Bill 4315). While
the failure of the bills to pass is ultimately a political matter and likely impossible to ascer-
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The CPA avoided the fate of previous efforts and was passed unanimously
by both the Illinois House and Illinois Senate. 94 Proponents of the bill
claimed it was "common-sense" legislation designed to protect a citizen's
right to speak out on important issues. 95 Not surprisingly, two supporters of
the bill, State Representatives Jack D. Franks and Sara Feigenholtz, mentioned specific cases within their respective districts as evidence of the
problem.96 Although the details were limited, both situations involved land
developers suing citizen advocates over public issues-classic SLAPP territory. 97 Notably, Representative Franks specifically stated that the CPA was
directly based on the Supreme Court's Omni decision.98 Absent one alteration, the bill was enacted as introduced with little or no debate. 99
B.

SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS OF THE ILLINOIS CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION ACT

The preamble to the CPA states that "[t]he information, reports, opinions, claims, arguments, and other expressions provided by citizens are vital
to effective law enforcement, the operation of government, the making of
public policy and decisions, and the continuation of representative democracy. '" l Accordingly, the self-announced public policy behind the CPA is
to "encourage[] and safeguard[] with great diligence" the "constitutional
rights of citizens and organizations to be involved and participate freely in
tain, in speaking to the Illinois House Judiciary Committee in relation to the CPA, State
Representative Jack D. Franks alluded to conflicting lobbying efforts as the reason for the
previous failures. Audio recording: Proceedings of the ill. H. Judiciary Comm., 95th Il.
Gen. Assem. (May 8, 2007) (on file with author).
94.
See B. Status for S.B. 1434, 95th Gen. Assem. (111. 2007), 15 LEGIS. SYNOPSIS &
DIGEST, at 926-27, availableat http://www.ilga.gov (follow "Bills and Resolutions" hyperlink; enter "SB1434" into the search field on the left of the page; then select the "Votes" tab
at the top; the resulting page will display links to the voting records for both the Illinois
House and Senate on the CPA).
95.
See Audio recording: Proceedings of the Ill. H. Judiciary Comm., 95th Ill.
Gen.
Assem. (May 8, 2007) (on file with author).
96.
See Audio recording: Proceedings of the Ill. H.R, Floor Debate, Third Reading,
95th 111.Gen. Assem. (May 31, 2007) (on file with author).
97.
Id.
98.
Id.
99.
The solitary amendment by the Illinois Senate dealt with Section 5 of the CPA.
The bill initially cited "[t]the threat of SLAPPs, personal liability, and burdensome litigation
costs" as the chilling effects the CPA was designed to prevent, however, the amendment
removed the "personal liability, and burdensome litigation costs" language. See B. Status for
S.B. 1434, 95th Gen. Assem. (111 2007), 15 LEGIS. SYNoPsIs & DIGEST, at 926-27, available
at http'//www.ilga.gov (follow "Bills and Resolutions" hyperlink; enter "SB1434" into the
search field on the left of the page; then select "Senate Floor Amendment No. 1" hyperlink).
See discussion infra, Part III.
100.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 5, 2007 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 5223
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/5).
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the process of government" and ensure that the "laws, courts, and other
agencies of this State. . . provide the utmost protection for the free exercise
of these rights of petition, speech, association, and government participation." 10 1
In addition to the policy underlying the CPA, the Act states four explicit goals. First, the CPA attempts "to strike a balance between the rights
of persons to file lawsuits for injury and the constitutional rights of persons
to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government." 10 2 Second, it attempts "to protect and encourage public participation in government to the maximum extent permitted by law."' 1 3 The third
purpose is "to establish an efficient process for identification and adjudication of SLAPPs."' 4 Finally,0 5the Act "provide[s] for attorney's fees and
costs to prevailing movants.'
The CPA attempts to achieve its stated goals through a series of substantive and procedural mechanisms: first, it explicitly immunizes certain
activity from civil liability; 106 second, it provides for expedited judicial
handling of motions filed under the CPA, including an accelerated appellate
process and cessation of discovery; 10 7 and third, it mandates a prevailing
movant be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with the motion. 108
The heart of the CPA is its broad grant of conditional immunity for
First Amendment activity derived from the Supreme Court's Omni decision.1°9 Section 15 of the CPA" 0 states that "[a]cts in furtherance of the
constitutional rights to petition, speech, association, and participation in
government are immune from liability, regardless of intent or purpose, ex-

101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id.
104.
Id.
105.
Id
Legis. Serv. 5224
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 15, 2007 Ill.
106.
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/15).
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 20, 2007 111.Legis. Serv. 5224
107.
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20).
108.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 25, 2007 111. Legis. Serv. 5224
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/25).
109.
According to proponents of the CPA, the conditional immunity language comes
directly from the Supreme Court's Omni case. Memorandum in Support of Senate Bill 1434
("The Citizen Participation Act"), from Mary Dixon, Legislative Dir. of the Am. Civil Liberto Rod Blagojevich, Ill. Governor (June 18, 2007), available at
ties Union of Ill.
http:/www.aclu-il.org/legislative/alerts/sb l434memo.pdf [hereinafter Dixon, ACLU Memorandum in Support].
110.
Pub. Act 95-506, § 15.
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cept when not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action,
result, or outcome.""'
A defendant can seek to have a plaintiff's case dismissed under the
CPA by filing a motion that essentially invokes the immunity. 112 No particular type of motion is required; it may take a number of different forms,
including a motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment, or motion to
strike. 1 3 The motion must allege that a plaintiff's claim is "based on, relates to, or is in response to any act or acts of the moving party in furtherance of the moving party's rights of4petition, speech, association, or to otherwise participate in government.""
Once the motion has been filed, the CPA mandates that a hearing be
held and that the trial court render a decision within ninety days of the respondent receiving notice of the filing." 5 All discovery is stayed pending
resolution of the motion, however, the court may grant limited discovery on
the issue of whether the moving party's acts fall under the immunity provisions of section 15, provided that the responding party show good cause for
allowing the limited discovery. 116 The court has an obligation to grant the
defendant's motion unless the responding party produces clear and convincing evidence that the acts giving rise to the suit were not immunized from
liability." 7 Thus, once a defendant files a motion invoking the immunity
provision of section 15, the burden of production, which would typically
shift to the defendant once the plaintiff establishes they have at least some
evidence to support the allegations contained in the complaint, shifts back
to the plaintiff to disprove the immunity by clear and convincing evidence. 118
The responding party can meet this burden in one of two ways: either
by producing clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's acts were
in no way connected to the rights immunized, or by proving that the acts,
while ostensibly in furtherance of the defendant's immunized rights, were
not "genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or

111.
Id.
112.
See id.
113.
For purposes of the CPA, "motion" is defined broadly, including "any motion to
dismiss, for summary judgment, or to strike, or any other judicial pleading filed to dispose of
a judicial claim." Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 10, 2007 Il. Legis. Serv.
5223 (West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/10).
114.
Pub. Act 95-506, § 15.
115.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 20(a), 2007 ill. Legis. Serv. 5224
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20(a)).
116.
Pub. Act 95-506, § 20(b).
117.
Pub. Act 95-506, § 20(c).
118.
See generally City of Chicago v. 1Il. Workers' Comp. Commbn, 871 N.E.2d 765,
774 (IIl. App. Ct. 2007) (discussing the usual sequence of burden shifts in Illinois).

2008]

SLAPPED IN ILLINOIS

outcome." 1 9 Should the responding party fail to do so, the CPA requires
that the movant be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs associated
with the section 15 motion. 20 Additionally, should the trial court deny the
defendant's motion or fail to rule on it within the prescribed ninety days,
121
the CPA mandates an expedited appeals process.
When viewed in totality, the substantive and procedural mechanisms
of the CPA appear to extend beyond the conduct implicated by the classic
SLAPP paradigm. Using Pring and Canan's definition of SLAPP122 as a
baseline, an overview of the CPA will show that it can apply to conduct far
outside that deemed essential to SLAPP nexus. First, where Pring and
Canan focus on the right to petition as the definitive hallmark of the
SLAPP, 123 the CPA applies not only to acts in furtherance of a citizen's
right to petition, but also acts in furtherance of a citizen's rights to "speech,
association, or to otherwise participate in government. 1 24 Second, while
Pring and Canan's definition of a SLAPP includes a public interest component, 25 the CPA contains no language limiting application of its provisions
to situations where a matter of social or civic concern is at issue. 126 This
divergence from the carefully crafted definition of SLAPPs put forth by
academicians catapults the CPA into the ranks of27the most expansive antiSLAPP legislation enacted by other jurisdictions.
IV.

ANTI-SLAPP LEGISLATION AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE

ILLINOIS CrIzEN PARTICIPATION ACT

There is one overarching problem connected with the provisions of the
CPA as enacted: because the CPA's grant of conditional immunity is broad
and potentially sweeping in its coverage, the CPA could, on its face, violate
Pub. Act 95-506, § 15. However, nowhere does the CPA define or provide a
119.
test for what exactly delineates genuine from non-genuine actions.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 25, 2007 111.Legis. Serv. 5224
120.
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/25) ("The court shall award a moving
party who prevails in a motion under this Act reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred
in connection with the motion.").
Pub. Act 95-506, § 20(a) ("An appellate court shall expedite any appeal or other
121.
writ, whether interlocutory or not, from a trial court order denying that motion or from a trial
court's failure to rule on that motion within 90 days after that trial court order or failure to
rule.").
122.
See supranote 17 and accompanying text.
123.
See supranote 17 and accompanying text.
Pub. Act 95-506, § 15.
124.
See supranote 17 and accompanying text.
125.
See Pub. Act 95-506, § 15.
126.
See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION, § 9:109 (2d ed. 1999 & Supp
127.
2007) (discussing how some anti-SLAPP statutes apply suits well outside Pring and Canan's

SLAPP definition).
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the balance it seeks to achieve between rights of citizens to freely speak,
petition, associate, and otherwise participate in the process of government
and the rights of potential plaintiffs to utilize the courts to recover for injuries incurred. 128 In contrast to other states that have limited use of their
respective anti-SLAPP statutes to defined sets of circumstances, 129 the
CPA's broad language may result in its application to a host of potential
situations for which it was not designed. This broad applicability could
chill potential plaintiffs from filing suit for otherwise valid claims and result in defendants bringing frivolous motions in hopes of benefiting from
the powerful mechanisms the CPA provides for dismissing a lawsuit. In
order to counteract these potential effects, Illinois courts will have to clarify
what constitutes activity "genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome"' 130 to provide guidance to trial courts and
practitioners in utilizing the CPA. Additionally, the Illinois General Assembly should consider amending the CPA to allow a prevailing plaintiff to
recover attorney's fees and costs should he131or she prove that a defendant's
motion was frivolous or dilatory in nature.
A.

THE RIGHTS AT ISSUE

The United States Constitution protects the rights of persons to speak,
associate, and petition the government for redress of grievances. 132 The
United States Supreme Court has held that the right to petition includes a
right of access to the courts. 133 The Illinois Constitution provides similar
protections, guaranteeing the rights of persons to "speak, write and publish
freely,"' 134 to "assemble in a peaceable manner" and "to make known their
35
opinions to their representatives and to apply for redress of grievances."'
Thus, citizens have both the right to speak their minds freely and have their
voices heard by their political leaders and to turn to the courts for a remedy

128.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 5, 2007 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 5223
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/5).
129.
See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
130.
Pub. Act 95-506, § 15.
131.
See Lum, supra note 72, at 436 (arguing for Hawaii to similarly amend its antiSLAPP statute).
132.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
133.
Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) ("Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access
to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.").
134.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
135.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 5.
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when they have been wronged. It is the careful
balancing of these impor36
tant rights that the CPA attempts to achieve. 1
B.

THE SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY OF THE ILLINOIS CITIZEN
PARTICIPATION ACT

Anti-SLAPP statutes can prove to be powerful tools for potential civil
defendants. 137 If used improperly, they can seemingly mirror the harm
sought to be prevented by anti-SLAPP legislation in the first place. 138 A
particular danger inherent in anti-SLAPP statutes is that when constructed
or construed too broadly in protecting the rights of defendants, they may
impose a counteractive chilling effect on prospective plaintiffs' own rights
to seek redress from the courts for injuries suffered. 139 The question that
inevitably arises is whether the provisions of the CPA properly effectuate
its stated purpose of "strik[ing] a balance between the rights of persons to
file lawsuits for injury and the constitutional rights of persons to petition,
speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government."140
As enacted, the CPA could arguably overstep its boundaries and fail in
its stated goals of balancing the interests of civil defendants and plaintiffs
by placing a substantial chill on any prospective plaintiffs right to seek
redress from the courts. Given its wide grant of immunity, 141 suspension of
discovery, 142 limited fee-shifting arrangements, 143 and liberalization provisions,' 44 the CPA arguably provides potential civil defendants an enticing
tool to rid themselves of the strain of a lawsuit without providing adequate
security for a plaintiffs countervailing interests. The CPA not only auto136.
See Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 5, 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 5223
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/5).
137.
See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 969 P.2d 564, 579 (Cal.
1999) (Baxter, J., dissenting) (calling the anti-SLAPP statute a "drastic and extraordinary
remedy").
138.
See Joshua L. Baker, Chapter 338: Another New Law, Another SLAPP in the
Face of California Business, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 409, 413-14 (2004) (arguing that some
California defendants were bringing anti-SLAPP motions to "increase the time and expense
for plaintiffs' attorneys to handle these cases") [hereinafter Barker, Chapter 338].
139.
See SMOLLA, supra note 127, at § 9:109 (explaining the chilling effect of antiSLAPP statutes on plaintiffs in libel suits).
140.
Pub. Act 95-506, § 5.
141.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 15, 2007 11. Legis. Serv. 5224
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/15).
142.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 20(b), 2007 111.Legis. Serv. 5224
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20(b)).
143.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 25, 2007 111.Legis. Serv. 5224
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/25).
144.
The CPA specifically states it is to be "construed liberally to effectuate its purposes and intent fully." Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 30(b), 2007 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 5224 (West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/30(b)).
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matically shifts the burden of production to the plaintiff to disprove the
defendant's allegations that the acts complained of arise from the defendant's constitutional rights of petition, speech, and association,1 45 but also
mandates that attorneys' fees related to the motion be awarded to the defendant should the plaintiff fail to meet his or her burden. 146 Additionally, any
defendant can invoke the provisions of the CPA simply by alleging that
their acts were in furtherance of their immunized constitutional rights and
that the plaintiffs lawsuit relates to such immunized activity. 147 The danger
thus exists that plaintiffs will be chilled from bringing otherwise meritorious claims because those claims happen to resemble a typical SLAPP and,
by bringing suit, the plaintiff risks incurring increased expenses
should he
148
or she fail to prove the defendant's acts were not immunized.
C.

THE CPA COMPARED TO ANTI-SLAPP LEGISLATION FROM OTHER
JURISDICTIONS

Well over twenty states have enacted some manner of statute aimed at
addressing the problem of SLAPPs. 149 While often containing similar
mechanisms to achieve their respective ends, such as stays on discovery,
fee-shifting arrangements, and expedited judicial handling, SLAPP statutes
vary considerably in the scope and breadth of their coverage. 150 When the
145.
See Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 20(c), 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv.
5224 (West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20(c)).
146.
See Pub. Act 95-506, § 25.
147.
See Pub. Act 95-506, § 15.
148.
Sean P. Trende, Defamation, Anti-SLAPP Legislation and the Blogoshpere:
New Solutions for an Old Problem, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 607, 645-46 (2006) (acknowledging
that the fee-shifting arrangements of anti-SLAPP legislation can chill a plaintiff's desire to
bring suit).
149.
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to 508 (West 2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
425.16-18 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136-8138 (1999); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 634F1 to 634F4 (West, Westlaw through 2007, Act 126); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-77-1 to 34-7-7-10 (West 1999); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2005); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2000); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 554.01 to 554.05 (West 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.528 (West, Westlaw through
2007 First Extraordinary Session of the 94th Gen. Assem.); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25,241 to
25,246 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.650 to 41.670 (LexisNexis 2006); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 38-2-9.1 to 38-2-9.2 (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2007); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§
70-a, 76-a (McKinney Supp. 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.150 to 31.155 (Supp. 2007);
27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7707, 8301 to 8305 (Supp. 2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to
9-33-4 (1997); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 4-21-1001 to 4-21-1004 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
78-58-101 to 78-58-105 (2002): WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.500 to 4.24.520 (West

2005).

150.
SMOLLA, supra note 127, at § 9:109. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295
(West 2005) (limiting application of anti-SLAPP statute to suits brought by government
agencies); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41.650 to 41.670 (LexisNexis 2006) (limiting applica-
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CPA is compared to legislation from other states, its broad applicability
becomes apparent and it arguably ranks amongst the most sweeping antiSLAPP statutes enacted to date.
In contrast to Illinois' broad grant of immunity to any defendant who
alleges their conduct was protected First Amendment activity, 5 ' some
states allow only certain classes of defendants to utilize an anti-SLAPP
motion.152 For example, defendants in Delaware, Nebraska, and New York
can only avail themselves of the protection afforded by the states' antiSLAPP statutes if they are sued by a "public applicant or permittee" and the
lawsuit relates to actions on the part of the defendant to oppose or comment
on efforts by the plaintiff to secure some type of favorable government endorsement, such as a zoning change, lease, or building permit.'53 Florida is
even more restrictive, allowing only defendants actually sued by govern54
mental entities to take shelter under the state's anti-SLAPP protections.
While statutes of this type have been criticized as being so narrow as to
exclude significant numbers of SLAPPs from their coverage,' 55 they have
as
the benefit of precisely applying only to classic SLAPP paradigms, such
56
developers suing citizens over their opposition to a zoning proposal. 1

tion of anti-SLAPP statute to defendants sued because of "good faith communication in
furtherance of the right to petition."); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302 (Supp. 2007) (limiting
application of anti-SLAPP statute to environmental cases).
151.
See Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 15, 2007 111.Legis. Serv. 5224
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/15).
SMOLLA, supranote 127, at § 9:109.
152.
153.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8136(a)(1) (1999) ("An 'action involving public
petition and participation' is an action, claim, cross-claim or counterclaim for damages that
is brought by a public applicant or permittee, and is materially related to any efforts of the
defendant to report on, rule on, challenge or oppose such application or permission."); NEB.
REv. STAT. § 25-21,242(1) (1995) ("Action involving public petition and participation shall
mean an action, claim, cross-claim, or counterclaim for damages that is brought by a public
applicant or permittee and is materially related to any efforts of the defendant to report on,
comment on, rule on, challenge, or oppose the application or permission;"); N.Y. Ov.
RIGHTS LAW § 76-a(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2008) ("An 'action involving public petition and
participation' is an action, claim, cross claim or counterclaim for damages that is brought by
a public applicant or permittee, and is materially related to any efforts of the defendant to
report on, comment on, rule on, challenge or oppose such application or permission.").
154.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295(5) (West 2005) (limiting relief under the antiSLAPP statute to "[a] person or entity sued by a governmental entity").
155.
See PRI.G & CANAN, supra note 6, at 194. (stating that New York's statute may
cover less than half of all SLAPPs); see also Lum, supra note 72, at 426-27 (echoing Pring
and Canan's assessment).
156.
SMOLLA, supra note 127, at § 9:109; Arco, supra note 57, at 597 (stating that
the Delaware, Nebraska and New York statutes "impart a precise standard for courts to
apply in discerning whether the target's activity is absolutely immune from liability").
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THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE

An example of the advantages and disadvantages of the narrow applicability of these types of statutes compared with the more broad immunity
granted by the CPA can be seen in the New York case of Gill Farms,Inc. v.
Darrow.157 In Gill Farms, the defendant responded to what she believed
was the improper spraying of aerial pesticides at a neighboring farm by
complaining to government officials and starting an advocacy group ostensibly designed to educate the public about the dangers associated with pesticide spraying. 158 The neighboring farmers claimed the defendant falsified
her complaints to government officials and that she had tortiously levied
threats against the contractor they employed to spray their fields, causing
him to quit, which, in turn, resulted in an infestation and complete loss of
the farmers' crops. 159 The farmers sued the defendant for tortious interference with their business and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 160
On its face, the plaintiffs' claim appeared to be a prototypical SLAPP 61 and
the defendant moved for dismissal under New York's anti-SLAPP legislation. 162 The trial court denied the defendant's motion and the appellate court
affirmed, holding that the anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable because the
plaintiff farmers had never applied for a permit to conduct aerial pesticide
spraying and therefore, they were not a "public applicant or permittee" for
purposes of the New York anti-SLAPP statute. 163
The Darrowresult might seem somewhat unjustified and overly technical on its face because it involves litigation that would likely qualify as a
SLAPP but the court was unable to employ the anti-SLAPP statute to dismiss the farmers' case. 64 However, it shows how through the use of the
"permittee" requirement New York has maintained a closer connection
between direct petitioning of government and statutory immunity from
SLAPPs than Illinois has with its broad grant of conditional immunity.

157.
682 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
158.
Id. at 307.
159.
Id. at 307-08.
160.
Id. at 308.
161.
The plaintiff's suit seems to meet all of Pring and Canan's requirements to be
classified as a SLAPP-by complaining to government officials, the defendant was engaged
in petitioning activity presumably designed to spur government action, such as levying a fine
against the plaintiffs or enjoining their spraying activities. The actions resulted in a claim for
damages against the defendant, and the subject of the suit concerned a matter of public interest, namely the potential harm caused by aerial pesticide spraying. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
162.
Darrow, 682 N.Y.S.2d at 308.
163.
Id. at 309.
164.
See id. at 997-98.
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This arguably leads to a more even balancing of rights between defendants'
rights to speech and petition and plaintiffs' right to redress.
Had the Darrowcase occurred in Illinois after passage of the CPA, the
result would likely be strikingly different. The defendant's petitioning and
speech activity would be immunized, even if it was maliciously directed at
injuring the plaintiff farmers, 165 unless the farmers could clearly establish
that the defendant's complaints to government officials or the activities of
the public advocacy group were not immunized activity or were not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action,'66 a burden it seems
they would have been unlikely to meet. Under the CPA, the burden of production would rest with the farmers to disprove the immunity of the defendant's
actions, 167 not with the defendant to establish the status of the plain168
tiff.

By limiting the scope of its anti-SLAPP provisions, the New York law
sacrifices protection for some speech and petitioning activities in exchange
for a more precise and limited scope of applicability-and a greater connec169
tion with direct petitioning activity between citizen and government.
This better protects plaintiffs' rights by lessening the number and type of
circumstances under which an otherwise legitimate or viable suit could be
dismissed as a SLAPP. In contrast, the CPA's broad applicability provides
greater protection for a defendant's rights to petition and speech, but reduces protection for a plaintiffs right to seek redress from the courts by
placing the burden of production on the plaintiff to disprove the immunity
of the defendant's activities 70 and by allowing the provisions of the act to
be invoked in all cases, without any need to prove the status of the litigating
parties. 171
Other state statutes, while more inclusive than those based on the respective status of the defendant and plaintiff, still retain some required connection between a defendant's acts and an attempt to directly influence the
165.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 15, 2007 111.Legis. Serv. 5224
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/15) (providing that a defendants constitutional acts are immune from liability "regardlessof intent or purpose") (emphasis added).
166. Id.
167.
See id.
168.
New York law places the burden of establishing the permittee status of the
plaintiff on the movant. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 321 l(g) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2008) (describing burden for anti-SLAPP statute in regard to motion to dismiss); N.Y. C.P.L.R
3212(h) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2008) (describing burden for anti-SLAPP statute in regard to motion for summary judgment).
169. See Arco, supranote 57, at 587.
170.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 20(c), 2007 I1l. Legis. Serv. 5224
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20(c)).
171.
See Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 5, 2007 111.Legis. Serv. 5223
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/5).
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actions of a governmental deliberative body. 172 For example, New Mexico's anti-SLAPP statute is limited to "conduct or speech undertaken or
made in connection with a public hearing or public meeting in a quasijudicial proceeding."' 173 Hawaii's anti-SLAPP statute is similar but more
limited, extending its coverage to situations where a defendant is sued for
statements or acts constituting "public participation," defined as "any oral
or written testimony submitted or provided to a governmental body during
the course of a governmental proceeding."' 74 Like the New York model,
these types of statutes limit the availability of an anti-SLAPP motion to a
defined set of circumstances, albeit circumstances defined by the place and
manner of the defendant's alleged petitioning activities rather than the
status of the person or entity to whom those activities relate. By doing so,
they strike a balance between defendants' and plaintiffs' rights more in
favor of the former than the New York-type statutes. However, statutes of
this type are still considerably more restrictive in terms of the conduct to
which they apply than the CPA, which requires absolutely no connection
between a defendant's
activity and a formal or semi-formal governmental
75
proceeding.1
Much like the CPA, the most expansive forms of anti-SLAPP legislation reject the requirement that the defendant's actions somehow relate to a
speech or conduct under review by a government body, instead extending
their reach to cover "virtually any exercise of free speech rights on matters
of public concern.' ' 176 These statutes tip the scales decidedly in favor of a
defendant's right to petition or speech at the expense of a plaintiff's right to

172. See SMOLLA, supranote 127, at § 9:109. Examples of states with statutes typically included in this categorization include New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1(A)
(LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2007), Hawaii, HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634F1-2 (West, Westlaw
current through 2007, Act 126), and Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2006). See
SMOLLA, supra note 127, at § 9:109 (identifying the Georgia, New Mexico, and Hawaii
statutes as moderate).
173. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 (A) (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2007).
174. HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 634F1-2 (West, Westlaw current through 2007, Act
126).
175. See Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 15, 2007 111.Legis. Serv. 5224

(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP.STAT. ANN. 110/15).
176. SMOLLA, supra note 127, at § 9:109. States regarded to have expansive antiSLAPP provisions include Louisiana, LA. CODE CIV. PRoc. ANN. art. 971 (2005), Oregon,
OR. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 31.150 - 31.155 (West Supp. 2007), and Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 554.01 to 554.05 (West 2000). SMOLLA, supranote 127, at § 9:109 (identifying the

Louisiana and Oregon laws as broad); Arco, supra note 57, at 603 (calling Minnesota's law
"perhaps the most broadly drawn of all"). For a slightly different categorization scheme, see
Shannon Hartzler, Note, ProtectingInformed Public Participation:Anti-SLAPP Law and the
Media Defendant 41 VAL. U.L. REv. 1235, 1262-70 (2007).
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access the courts. 177 The result is the potential for a paradoxical form of
vexatious litigation. While anti-SLAPP statutes are designed, at least in
part, to avoid the use of judicial processes themselves as a means of intimidating or punishing an opponent,178 the most broadly drawn anti-SLAPP
statutes arguably have the same effect on potential plaintiffs because they
expand use of anti-SLAPP remedies to conduct
that has little or no connec79
tion to the traditional SLAPP paradigm. 1
E.

THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE

Widely regarded as one of the most far-reaching of all anti-SLAPP
laws when it was passed in 1992,180 California's law' 8 ' provides that any
"cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United
States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be
subject to a special motion to strike."'' 82 The law defines the types of petitioning and speech activities that qualify liberally, so as to include any
statement made either directly before a government or quasi-governmental
body or any statement made that somehow relates to an issue being considered by such a body. 83 The law also applies to public statements or other
177.
See generally Arco, supra note 57, at 587 (exploring how the tension between
the rights of petition and free speech and the right to seek redress from the courts is affected
by SLAPPs and anti-SLAPP legislation).
178.
See Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 5, 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 5223
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. AM. 110/5).
179.
See SMOLLA, supra note 127, at § 9:109 (discussing how California's antiSLAPP statute applies to cases not strictly considered SLAPPs).
180.
See, e.g., Jerome I. Braun, California'sAnti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven Years,
34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 731, 732 (calling the California statute "the most ambitious and farreaching of all the state anti-SLAPP laws" at the time of its enactment).
181.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16-18 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
182.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
183.
The full text of the applicability provisions states:
As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a person's right of petition
or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue" includes: (1) any written or oral statement or
writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or
any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other
official proceeding authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement
or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
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conduct in furtherance of the rights to petition or speech, as long as those
statements bear some connection to an issue of public interest.'4
In Briggs v. Eden CouncilforHope & Opportunity, the Supreme Court
of California determined the language of the California anti-SLAPP statute
mandated a broad construction, concluding a defendant in California could
take shelter under the anti-SLAPP law in one of two ways. 85 A defendant
could invoke the anti-SLAPP statute by showing that his or her speech or
conduct was somehow related to an official proceeding, regardless of
whether or not the official proceeding had any connection with a public
issue, or by establishing that his or her speech, while having no connection
to a governmental proceeding, was related to a public issue or an issue of
public interest. 8 6 The dissent vehemently disagreed with the majority's
interpretation, calling it "overly broad" and fearing it would "expand[] the
definition of a SLAPP suit to include a potentially huge number of cases"
and make "the special motion to strike available in an untold number of
legal actions that will bear no resemblance to the paradigm retaliatory
SLAPP 1suit
to which the remedial legislation was specifically ad87
dressed."'
The dissenting justices' fears were arguably realized in Navellier v.
Sletten188 In Navellier, the plaintiffs sued the defendant for fraud and
breach of contract relating to the alleged violation of a liability release the
defendant executed in connection with a prior lawsuit.' 89 The defendant
countered by filing a motion to strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute.190 The trial court denied the motion and the reviewing appellate court
affirmed. 19'
The Supreme Court of California found the "critical consideration" in reviewing motions to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute was
"whether the cause of action is based on the defendant's protected free
speech or petitioning activity," and held that the defendant's execution of
the liability release constituted such activity and therefore potentially fell
184.
Id.
185.
See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 969 P.2d 564, 575 (Cal.
1999).
186.
Briggs, 969 P.2d at 575.; Jewett v. Capital One Bank, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 679
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Briggs).
187.
Briggs, 969 P.2d at 579 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
188.
Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703 (Cal. 2002). The California courts have since
found the anti-SLAPP law applicable to numerous cases that seem, at best, remotely related
to the paradigmatic SLAPP situation. See, e.g., Kronernyer v. Internet Movie Data Base,
Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (finding anti-SLAPP statute protected informational on-line movie site from plaintiff seeking declaratory relief over defendant's failure
to credit him as a producer in several movie listings on their website).
189. Navallier,52 P.3d at 707, 713.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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under the gamut of the anti-SLAPP statute. 192 The court remanded the case
to the appellate level to determine whether the plaintiffs could defeat the
anti-SLAPP
statute by "establishing a probability of prevailing on their
93
claim."1
Like in Briggs, the majority's decision was vigorously criticized, the
dissent arguing that the "SLAPP problem warrants a specific remedy. Unfortunately, the majority opts for an all-inclusive definition of SLAPP's,
which ignores the practical impact of legal rules, treats identical cases differently, and may chill the right of petitioning the law was designed to protect," and that the majority's "presumptive application of [the anti-SLAPP
statute] will burden parties with meritorious claims and chill parties with
nonfrivolous ones."' 194 In sum, the dissent believed the "cure ha[d] become
the disease-SLAPP
motions are now just the latest form of abusive litiga195
tion."
After Navellier and other cases that broadly interpreted California's
anti-SLAPP statute, 196 the California legislature amended the law so as to
limit its availability where the defendant is a business entity and is sued
over acts constituting commercial speech or where the plaintiff is bringing
suit exclusively for the benefit of the general public or solely in relation to
an issue of public concern. 197 However, one practitioner has concluded that
even this action by the California legislature "will not completely eliminate
the expanded use of the anti-SLAPP statute. The anti-SLAPP statute will
continue to apply to 'garden variety' claims . . . [and] there will be considerable litigation to determine which plaintiffs are exempted from, and
which defendants can bring, motions to strike," concluding that "[o]nly one
certainty exists. Until the legislature constricts
its scope, every type of de198
statute."'
anti-SLAPP
the
invoke
will
fendant
192.
Id.at 709,713.
193.
Navellier, 52 P.3d at 713. The California statute provides that a plaintiff facing
a special motion to strike can defeat the motion by establishing that "there is a probability
that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim." CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2004
& Supp. 2007). Not surprisingly, on remand the plaintiffs were unable to meet their burden
and the California Court of Appeal for the First District dismissed their claims under the
anti-SLAPP statute. Navellier v. Sletten, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 201, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
194.
Navellier, 52 P.3d at 714 (Brown, J., dissenting).
195.
Id.
196.
See, e.g., Dupont Merck Pharm. Co. v. Super. Ct., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 757
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (affording SLAPP protection to a drug manufacturer sued over false
statements made to government regulators).
197.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.17(b), (c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007). For a
discussion of the impact of this new legislation, see generally Barker, Chapter 338, supra
note 138.
198.
Edward P. Sangster, Back SLAPP: Has the Development of Anti-SLAPP Law
Turned the Statute Into a Tool to be Used Against the Very Parties it was Intended to Protect?, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2003, at 37, 48.
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California's experience serves as a cautionary tale: while California's
law was ostensibly designed to remedy one form of vexatious litigation, 199
it arguably created another. California defendants have invoked the antiSLAPP statute in a number of contexts that seemingly have little or no relation to ensuring public participation in government, including foreclosure
and nuisance suits.2°° Plaintiffs with legitimate causes of action who find
themselves facing a motion to dismiss in these types of scenarios must presumably expend time, effort and resources in defeating facetious claims of
immunity, possibly deterring them from bringing otherwise valid claims. 20'
Given the broad grant of immunity and powerful tools the CPA places at
the disposal of defendants in civil suits, Illinois courts could very well encounter unintended effects similar to those experienced by California.
F.

THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE

The potential for the CPA to overstretch its bounds and fail in its
stated goals is exacerbated by the lack of any requirement that conditionally
immunized conduct relate to an issue of public concern.20 2 Pring and Canan
consider the involvement of an issue of public concern central to their definition of a SLAPP 20 3 and a number of anti-SLAPP statutes from other states
only extend immunity to situations where the defendant's conduct giving
rise to the suit relates to such an issue. 204 However, the CPA contains no

199.
Although the California law does not mention SLAPPs directly, a facial intent
to eliminate them can be inferred. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2004 &
Supp. 2007) ("The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in
lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom
of speech and petition for the redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it
is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process.").
200.
See Garretson v. Post, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 230, 232 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (filing of
anti-SLAPP motion in wrongful foreclosure action related to loan default); Castillo v.
Pacheco, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (filing of anti-SLAPP motion by defendant who alleged that plaintiff's nuisance suit violated his right to free exercise of religion).
201.
Trende, supra note 148, at 646. However, the author believes any potential
chilling effects on plaintiffs are substantially outweighed by the importance of the defendant's First Amendment rights. See Trende, supranote 148, at 646.
202.
See Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 15, 2007 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 5224
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/15).
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
203.
204.
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-7-7-1 (West 1999) (stating that the law "applies
to an act in furtherance of a person's right of petition or free speech under the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of the State of Indiana in connection with apublic issue
or an issue of public interest") (emphasis added); R-I. GEN. LAws § 9-33-2(a) (1997) ("A
party's exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or
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such requirement and, as a result, may apply to cases that are wholly private
disputes between two persons, with little or no connection to the types of
important
citizen interaction with government the law was designed to pro205
tect.
In DuracraftCorp. v. Holmes Products Corp.20 6 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts had occasion to interpret the state's anti-SLAPP
statute2 °7 and discussed its lack of a public interest element at length.2 °8 The
plaintiff, Duracraft Corporation, claimed that a former employee who had
left to work for a competitor, Holmes Products, breached fiduciary duties
and a nondisclosure agreement when he consulted with Holmes' attorneys
and gave deposition testimony about an ongoing trademark dispute between
the two companies. 20 9 The employee and Holmes moved to dismiss the suit
under Massachusetts's anti-SLAPP statute, alleging the deposition testimony was petitioning activity and therefore immune from liability. 210 The
trial court denied the defendants' motion and the appellate court affirmed.21'
In construing the statute, the supreme court held that the anti-SLAPP
law was not limited to cases where the underlying petitioning activity involved a matter of public interest because such language was expressly
rejected in the legislative history of the law.212 However, indoing so, the
Rhode Island constitutions in connection with a matter ofpublic concern shall be conditionally immune from civil claims, counterclaims, or cross-claims.") (emphasis added).
205.
See Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 5, 2007 11. Legis. Serv. 5223
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/5).
206.
691 N.E.2d 935, 939 (Mass. 1998).
207. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2000).
208.
See Duracraft, 691 N.E.2d. at 941. For an in-depth analysis of the Duracraft
decision and its impact on Massachusetts jurisprudence, see Rebecca Ariel Hoffberg, The
Special Motion Requirements of the MassachusettsAnti-SLAPP Statute: A Real Slap in the
Facefor TraditionalCivil Practiceand Procedure,16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 97 (2006).
209.
Duracraft,691 N.E.2d. at 937-38.
210.
Id.at 939. The Massachusetts law defines "a party's exercise of its right of petition" as:
[A]ny written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any
written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any
other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, executive,
or judicial body or any other governmental proceeding; any statement
reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect such
consideration; or any other statement falling within constitutional protection of the right to petition government.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2000).
Duracraft,691 N.E.2d at 938.
211.
212.
Id.at 941.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 28

court expressed concern that the statute was ill-suited to achieving its stated
purpose and that it unduly infringed on a potential plaintiff's own right to
petition the government.2 13 Although the lower 21
courts'
denial of Duracraft's
4
motion was upheld, the precedent had been set.
Since Duracrafi, defendants in Massachussetts, like those in California, have invoked the anti-SLAPP statute in situations that fall well outside
the traditional SLAPP definition.2 5 Given that the CPA grants defendants
immunity regardless of whether or not their actions relate to a matter of
public concern,2 16 Illinois can expect similar results. By foregoing any public concern requirement, the CPA takes a remedy designed to combat a specific problem and expands its potential applicability to situations it was
arguably never intended to address.
The legislative history and preamble to the CPA make it clear that it
was a law designed to remedy SLAPPs, not to grant immunity to litigants in
disputes concerning the furtherance of solely private interests. 217 As originally drafted, the CPA stated that the "threat of SLAPPs, personal liability,
and burdensome litigation costs significantly chills and diminishes citizen
participation in government, voluntary public service, and the exercise of..
important constitutional rights. 21 8 The "personal liability" and "burdensome litigation costs" language was excised from the statute by the Illinois
Senate before the law was passed. 219 The Senator sponsoring the bill, John
J. Cullerton, called the change a "technical amendment" and the rationale
213.
Id.at 943. ("Despite the apparent purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute to dispose
expeditiously of meritless lawsuits that may chill petitioning activity, the statutory language
fails to track and implement such an objective. By protecting one party's exercise of its right
of petition, unless it can be shown to be sham petitioning, the statute impinges on the adverse party's exercise of its right to petition, even when it is not engaged in sham petitioning.").
214.
The Court adopted an interpretation of the anti-SLAPP statute that would bar a
plaintiff's claim only if it was exclusively based on a defendant's petitioning conduct. Id.
Because Duracraft's claims were based on both the employee's petitioning activity (the
deposition testimony) and non-petitioning activity (the nondisclosure agreement) the Supreme Court ruled that a dismissal was unwarranted. Id at 943-44.
215.
See N. Am. Expositions Co. v. Corcoran, 874 N.E.2d 466, 470-71 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2007) (invoking anti-SLAPP statute in dispute between owner of convention center and
former licensee); Baker v. Hobson, 818 N.E.2d 1087, 1088 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (invoking
anti-SLAPP statute in property line dispute between neighbors).
216.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 15, 2007 III. Legis. Serv. 5224

(West) (codified at 735

ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.

110/15).

(West) (codified at 735

ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.

110/5).

217.
218.

See Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 5, 2007 111.Legis. Serv. 5223

B. Status for S.B. 1434, 95th Gen. Assem. (Ill.
2007), 15 LEGIS. SYNoPsIs &
DIGEST, at 926-27, available at http://www.ilga.gov (follow "Bills and Resolutions" hyperlink; enter "SB1434" into the search field on the left of the page; then select "Senate Floor
Amendment No. 1" hyperlink).
219.
Id.
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behind it was not discussed or debated on the Senate floor. 220 However, he
did explain the purpose behind the CPA, stating that it was designed to
combat "certain lawsuits that could be filed that significantly would chill
[sic] and diminish citizen participation in government or voluntary public
service or the exercise of those constitutional rights.",22 1 The preamble to the
CPA echoes the purpose stated by Senator Cullerton in supporting the legislation. It speaks in broad terms about the importance of citizen interaction
with the government, not about protecting parties in private disputes. 222 It
therefore seems relatively clear that the CPA was designed to remedy
SLAPPs, and as Pring and Canan's definition states, SLAPPs relate to is223
sues of public interest.
G.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Despite the CPA's potential to overstep its boundaries and apply to
situations well outside the classic SLAPP definition, two actions could be
taken that would help the CPA achieve its stated goals of balancing the
rights of potential plaintiffs and defendants. 224 First, Illinois courts should
utilize the two-prong test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries,
Inc.225 to determine when petitioning activity is not "genuinely aimed at
procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome" and therefore
outside the protection afforded by the conditional immunity provision of
section 15 .226 Second, the Illinois General Assembly should consider
amending the fee-shifting provisions of the CPA to allow a prevailing respondent to recover costs2 27incurred in defeating a movant's motion should
certain conditions be met.
Although the CPA defines numerous terms used through the Act, it
does not explicitly define what constitutes speech or conduct not "genuinely
220.
See Transcript, IlI. Gen. Assem., 95th Reg. Sess., April 20, 2007, at 14-15,
availableat http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans95/09500029.pdf.
221.
Id.at 15.
222.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act. 95-506, § 5, 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 5223
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/5) ("The information, reports, opinions,
claims, arguments, and other expressions provided by citizens are vital to effective law enforcement, the operation of government, the making of public policy and decisions, and the
continuation of representative democracy.").
223.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
224.
See Pub. Act 95-506, § 5.
225.
Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.,
508 U.S. 49 (1993).
226.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 15, 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 5224
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/15).
227.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 25, 2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 5224
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/25).
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' 22 8
aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome.
This omission is somewhat glaring considering that a responding party can
only defeat the motion by proving such a lack of genuineness or by establishing the acts giving rise to the suit are not constitutionally protected or in
furtherance of acts constitutionally protected. 229 The lack of a precise standard by which to determine the genuineness of a petitioning party's activities compounds the potential of the CPA to impose a chilling effect on a
plaintiffs right to gain remedy and redress from the courts. If potential
plaintiffs cannot reasonably determine what conduct falls outside the CPA's
protections, they very well might defer suit on otherwise meritorious claims
for fear that the defendant will invoke the immunity provisions of the
CPA-a result inconsistent with the goals of the law.23 °
Furthermore, once litigation has commenced and a defendant does, in
fact, invoke the immunity provisions of section 15, a reasonably clear standard regarding the genuineness provision2 31 will provide guidance to both
courts and plaintiffs regarding what manner of limited discovery should be
allowed in regard to the moving party's acts, further expediting the resolution of the dispute. Additionally, in order to effectuate the CPA's goal of
encouraging citizen participation in government,232 the types of conduct to
which the law applies should be clear so that the citizenry is able to readily
ascertain whether or not the actions in which they intend to engage fall under the CPA's protective umbrella because, as the Illinois General Assembly recognized, it is not only the actual filing of SLAPPs that chills citizen participation in government, but the threat of SLAPPs as well. 234 A
clear standard would help defendants understand prior to any litigation
whether or not the conduct they intend to engage in is protected, potentially
leading to a more politically proactive and confident citizen.

228.
See Pub. Act 95-506, § 25.
229.
See Pub. Act 95-506, § 15; Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 20(c),
2007 Ill. Legis. Serv. 5224 (West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/20(c)).
230.
See Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 5, 2007 111.Legis. Serv. 5223
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/5).
231.
See Pub. Act 95-506, §20 (b) ("[D]iscovery may be taken, upon leave of court
for good cause shown, on the issue of whether the movant's acts are not immunized from, or
are not in furtherance of acts immunized from, liability by this Act.").
232.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 5, 2007 111.Legis. Serv. 5223
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/5).
233.
Id. ("The threat of SLAPPs significantly chills and diminishes citizen participation in government, voluntary public service, and the exercise of these important constitutional rights.").
234.
Ralph Michael Stein, SLAPP Suits: A Slap at the First Amendment 7 PACE
ENVTL L. REv. 45, 55 (1989) ("[O]ften the threat [of SLAPPs], rather than the institution of
litigation achieves the desired result of intimidation and surrender.").
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As a preliminary matter, when interpreting statutes, Illinois courts can
look beyond the statute's plain language only if the meaning of the statutory
provision in question is unclear or ambiguous. 235 A statute is ambiguous
when it is "capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses. 236 Section 15 can be so understood
because it does not state whether the genuineness of a moving party's acts
or conduct are to be determined on an objective or subjective basis.237
Should an Illinois court find this provision of the CPA ambiguous, then it
could look to the legislative history of the law to determine the meaning of
the language.238
In doing so, any reviewing court would likely uncover the CPA's explicit origins in the Supreme Courts' Omni decision. 239 From that point, it is
a small step to view the two-prong test of ProfessionalReal Estate Investors24 ° as a logical standard to employ in clarifying what constitutes activity
falling outside the protection of the CPA, as ProfessionalReal Estate Investors explicitly interpreted the "sham" provision of the Noerr-Pennington
24 2
doctrine,24' which serves as the basis for the CPA's immunity standards.
ProfessionalReal Estate Investors articulates a two-tiered approach to determining whether petitioning activity lacks genuineness.2 3 First, a court
must determine whether the petitioning activities of the party claiming immunity are "objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant
could realistically expect success on the merits." 244 Immunity will be
granted should an "objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to elicit a favorable outcome., 245 If a court finds that a
suit is objectively baseless, then the second prong of the test looks to the
subjective motivation behind the petitioning party's activity to determine
whether the judicial process itself, rather than the outcome of that process,
is the goal of the litigation.2 6

235.
See, e.g., Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1053-54 (111. 1999).
236.
In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747, 768 (ill. 2003) (quoting Illinois v. Jameson, 642
N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (111. 1994)).
237.
See Prof l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S.
49, 61 (1993) ("The word 'genuine' has both objective and subjective connotations.").
238.
See Kunkel, 689 N.E.2d at 1053-54.
239.
See supranote 109 and accompanying text.
240.
Prof I Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S.
49(1993).
241.
See Prof'lReal Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60.
242.
Dixon, ACLU Memorandum in Support, supranote 109.
243.
Prof'lReal Estate Investors, 508 U.S. at 60.
244.
Id.
245.
Id.
246.
See id. at 60-61.
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The objective/subjective approach of ProfessionalReal Estate Investors is still a fact-specific inquiry and would not provide a bright-line rule
to determine what conduct falls within the scope of the CPA, but it would
provide litigants with a more specific standard than the currently ambiguous
language of section 15.247 Rhode Island's anti-SLAPP statute contains a
conditional immunity provision similar to the CPA 248 and specifically defines when conduct is not "genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action, result or outcome" 249 in a manner based on the Court's Professional Real Estate Investors test. 250 Furthermore, the test has arguably
2511
proven to be a fair and efficient standard that works well in practice.
In addition to adopting the ProfessionalReal Estate Investors test for
determining what constitutes genuine petitioning or speech activity, the
potential for the broad sweep of the CPA to chill potential plaintiffs' desire
to bring suit could be lessened by allowing a party responding to the motion
to recover his or her costs under certain circumstances.2 52
Because much of the chilling effect arising from SLAPPs stems from
the cost of mounting a legal defense, fee-shifting provisions are a necessary
element of any effective anti-SLAPP statute.253 However, they can also
Legis. Serv. 5224
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 15, 2007 I1.
247.
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.110/15).
248. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(a) (1997) ("A party's exercise of his or her right of
petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode Island constitutions in connection
with a matter of public concern shall be conditionally immune from civil claims, counterclaims, or cross-claims. Such immunity will apply as a bar to any civil claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim directed at petition or free speech as defined in subsection (e) of this section,
except if the petition or free speech constitutes a sham. The petition or free speech constitutes a sham only if it is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action,
result, or outcome, regardless of ultimate motive or purpose.").
249. Id.('The petition or free speech will be deemed to constitute a sham as defined
in the previous sentence only if it is both: (1) Objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable person exercising the right of speech or petition could realistically expect success in
procuring the government action, result, or outcome, and (2) Subjectively baseless in the
sense that it is actually an attempt to use the governmental process itself for its own direct
effects. Use of outcome or result of the governmental process shall not constitute use of the
governmental process itself for its own direct effects.").
250. Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56, 62 (R.I. 1996).
See Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, 762 A.2d 1208, 1210, 1213 (RI.
251.
2000) (utilizing "objectively baseless" standard to dismiss defamation claim by waste recycler against a neighbor who made statements concerning recycler's operations to local newspaper); Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 743, 747, 754 (R.I. 2004) (utilizing
"objectively baseless" standard to dismiss defamation claim by public official against citizen
who had written letters to local newspaper alleging official was corrupt).
252. See Lum, supranote 72, at 436 (stating that the inability of a plaintiff to recover
attorneys' fees and costs "imposes a costly and unfair burden on a filer who must defend its
(legitimate) claim against a target's improper motion to dismiss").
See PRrNG & CANAN,SLAPPs, supra note 6, at 204-05 (providing for attorney's
253.
fees and costs in their model anti-SLAPP statute).
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impose a chilling effect on potential plaintiffs because "[p]laintiffs who
have valid-yet-borderline claims may well decide not to bring suit because
of the fear of being forced to pay a defendants' legal bills, especially if the
defendant is a large corporation., 254 Given the substantial risk that the
breadth of the CPA will already impose such a chilling effect on potential
plaintiffs, the Illinois legislature should consider amending the law to allow
a prevailing respondent to recover his or her fees if they make a showing
that the movant's assertion of immunity under section 15 was frivolous or
otherwise disingenuous.255
Other states allow for an award of reciprocal fees in such situations.256
The frivolous standard would curb the potential use of the CPA by defendants whose case might have no real relation to immunized activity, but
who would bring a motion anyway in hope of procuring a quick, efficient
dismissal. 257 At the same time, by setting a higher, more flexible, standard
for a plaintiff to recover, the benefits derived from the mandatory award of
fees to a prevailing movant258 will not be vitiated because a defendant with
an honest belief in the protected nature of his or her conduct would face no
risk of an adverse award of fees.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to disagree with the motivations behind the Citizen Participation Act. After all, what greater calling is there for elected officials
than safeguarding the rights that lie at the heart of representative democracy? As such, the Illinois General Assembly should be commended for
tackling the complicated and important issue of SLAPPs. However, as has
proven to be the case in other states, anti-SLAPP statutes can radically alter
the fine balance between one person's right to be heard and another person's right to seek redress from the courts. The CPA attempts to preserve
this balance but employs mechanisms that make achievement of that laudable goal difficult. The broad grant of conditional immunity, lack of any
254.
Trende, supra note 148, at 646.
See Lum, supra note 72, at 436.
255.
256.
E.g. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007) ("If the court
finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on
the motion ....
");IND. CODE ANN. § 34-7-7-8 (West 1999) ("If a court finds that a motion
to dismiss made under this chapter is: (1) frivolous; or (2) solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and costs to answer
the motion."); see also Lum, supra note 72, at 436 (discussing the California and Indiana

statutes).
257.
258.

See Lum, supra note 72, at 436.
Citizen Participation Act, Pub. Act 95-506, § 5, 2007 1l. Legis. Serv. 5223
(West) (codified at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/5).
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required nexus between protected activity and issues of public concern, and
absence of defined standards for what constitutes conduct "genuinely aimed
at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome"2 59 all serve to
undermine the viability of the CPA as an effective means of securing the
competing interests of civil plaintiffs and defendants. The ultimate hope is
that legislators and judges will fashion creative and effective solutions to
these problems. As it stands, it looks as if they will be forced to.
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